In our previous DORA blog article, we covered classifying and reporting an incident once it happens. This blog article looks at the requirement built to reduce how often an incident occurs, proving, before an attacker does, that a critical service can withstand one.

Most financial services firms already run a testing programme. Vulnerability scans happen on a schedule. Penetration tests get commissioned, findings get logged, and a report gets filed somewhere a board member could locate it if asked. On paper, that looks like compliance. Under DORA, it is not.

A distinction worth making immediately, because it shapes everything that follows: DORA requires basic resilience testing of critical and important functions from every in-scope firm. Threat-led penetration testing (TLPT) is a separate, additional obligation that applies only to a targeted set of larger and more systemically important entities, identified by their competent authority.

NOTE: If you are a smaller regulated firm reading this, the testing obligations below still apply to you; the TLPT-specific sections further down may not, unless your authority has told you otherwise.

DORA’s testing regime is built on a different question to the one most testing programmes answer. It does not ask whether you tested something. It asks whether your testing demonstrates that a critical or important function can withstand a realistic attack, and for the firms in scope for the highest tier, whether an independent, authorised attacker has actually tried to break it under conditions that mimic a genuine adversary.

This is a materially higher standard than an annual scan and a penetration test tucked into a compliance folder.

Testing already happens, and happens well

So let’s start with what is working, because it is most of the picture. Financial Services firms have run vulnerability management and penetration testing for years, often to a higher standard than many other regulated sectors. Annual and quarterly scanning cadences are common. External penetration testing against internet-facing infrastructure is standard practice, and many firms already run it more frequently than any regulation requires. Security teams in this sector are not short of testing experience, testing tooling, or testing discipline.

That maturity is real, and it matters. It means the foundation DORA is building on, a technically capable, well-resourced security testing function, is already in place across most of the sector. The gap is not in the testing itself. It is in what the testing is aimed at, how it is structured, and what happens with the result.

DORA tests the business service, not the system

Most existing penetration testing programmes are scoped around infrastructure. An external perimeter, a set of applications, a network segment. That scoping makes sense operationally, but it answers a narrower question than DORA is asking. DORA’s testing framework is explicitly structured around critical and important business functions, the actual services the entity delivers, and the ICT systems that support them end to end, including the third parties involved in delivering them.

This distinction is not superficial. A penetration test that confirms a payment gateway’s external interface is well defended tells you very little about whether the payment service as a whole would survive a coordinated attack that also touches a cloud provider’s authentication layer, an outsourced settlement process, and an internal system nobody thought to scope in. Scenario-based testing – tabletop exercises and live simulations that follow a business service through a plausible failure chain, rather than testing a system in isolation, is a specific DORA requirement precisely because infrastructure-scoped testing misses this.

Then there is TLPT which sits in a different category altogether. TLPT is not a bigger penetration test. It is a live, red-team-style exercise conducted against live production systems, built around real threat intelligence about the actors most likely to target the entity, and run under a formal methodology (in the EU, TIBER-EU) that requires coordination with the entity’s competent authority throughout. For firms in scope, this is required at least every three years, and it requires a level of internal governance, legal preparation and stakeholder buy-in that most organisations have never had to build, because nothing in their existing testing programme has ever demanded it.

The honest complication for most security leaders reading this is your current programme is probably testing the right systems well. It may not be testing the right services at all, and if TLPT applies to you, it is very unlikely to already be structured for it.

So what does this actually mean?

If you run a strong vulnerability and penetration testing function already, the natural instinct is to treat DORA testing as a scope extension, test a few more things, a little more often. That instinct will leave gaps in three specific places which we highlight below:

Remediation evidence – DORA does not just want a list of findings. It wants demonstrable closure. Evidence that every finding was actually resolved, by whom, and by when, tracked with the same discipline as the testing itself. A penetration test report with an unclosed high-severity finding from eighteen months ago is not a testing gap under DORA. It is a governance gap, and it is one of the first things a supervisor will ask to see.

Co-ordination – If threat-led penetration testing applies to your organisation, it cannot be run the way a standard penetration test is commissioned – scoped internally, executed, and reported. TLPT requires engagement with your competent authority before testing begins, a threat intelligence provider to build the scenario, a specialist testing provider accredited to run it, and internal stakeholders – legal, operations, the board, briefed on what a live attack against production systems actually means in practice. None of that exists in a standard testing budget or timeline, and building it under time pressure, close to a deadline, is where firms lose control of the process.

Business service framing – If your testing programme cannot currently produce a mapped inventory of critical and important functions with the ICT systems and third parties that support each one, you cannot yet scope scenario-based testing correctly. Because you do not yet know what a realistic failure chain for that service looks like. This is a dependency most firms do not realise their testing programme has until they try to build a test plan against it.

Where should the focused priorities be

From our experience at Cyberfort when we surface the gaps above, we recommend a four step sequence, so testing is built outward from the business, not inward from the infrastructure you already know how to test.

Build or confirm the inventory of critical and important business functions and the ICT systems, including third parties, that support each one. This is the input every other testing decision depends on. Without it, scenario-based testing is guesswork about what to include.

Layer scenario-based testing – tabletop first, live exercises second, onto the critical functions identified above, alongside your existing vulnerability assessment and penetration testing cadence. The two should run as one coordinated programme, not two separate compliance activities.

Every finding, from every test type, needs an owner, a deadline and a closure record that can be produced on request. If this does not already exist as a formal process, it is one of the fastest fixes available and one of the first things scrutinised.

Identify your competent authority contact, understand the coordination process end to end, and brief your board and legal function on what authorising a live attack against production systems actually involves. This groundwork takes longer than the test itself.

How do you know if your resilience testing is effective

Testing generates a lot of activity. From our experience at Cyberfort we believe the following measures tell you whether the activity you are undertaking is reducing risk, not just producing reports.

Finding closure rate within agreed remediation deadlines – This is the single clearest signal of whether testing changes anything. A programme that generates findings faster than it closes them is not building resilience, it is building a backlog. Aim for the large majority of findings – vulnerability, penetration test and scenario-based alike, closed within the deadline originally agreed for each severity level.

Time to close critical and high-severity findings specifically – Averages hide the risk that matters most. A programme can look healthy overall while a critical finding on a payment system sits open for months. Track this separately, and aim for critical findings closed in days, not the weeks or months that a blended average might allow.

Proportion of critical and important functions covered by scenario-based testing in the last cycle – This tells you whether your testing programme has actually been reframed around business services, or whether it is still infrastructure-scoped with a new label. Full coverage of the mapped critical function inventory is the target; a partial programme signals scoping work still to do.

Recurrence rate of previously closed findings – A finding that reappears after being marked closed means the fix did not address the underlying cause. This matters more than raw finding volume, because it tells you whether remediation is real or cosmetic. Aim for this to be close to zero, any meaningful recurrence rate is worth investigating on its own.

TLPT and rehearsal governance readiness, if in scope – This is less a number and more a status check. Is your competent authority relationship established, is your threat intelligence input current, and has your board actually been briefed on what the exercise involves. Readiness here should be continuous, not built in the months before the test is due. A programme that starts governance work only when the three-year deadline approaches is already behind.

DORA itself does not prescribe numeric thresholds for any of the measures above; there is no rule stating a specific closure percentage or a specific number of days. The benchmarks here are directional good-practice targets, reflecting what a mature testing programme should be capable of, not figures lifted from a named regulatory standard or study. Set your own thresholds against your risk appetite and the criticality of the function in question and expect a critical payment or settlement service to warrant a tighter target than a lower-tier internal system.

Where you may need further support

Two areas consistently sit beyond what an internal team can build alone, whatever its testing maturity.

The first is threat-led penetration testing itself. Working with an accredited testing provider brings you the outcome that matters. A scenario built on threat intelligence current enough to be credible, and a testing process that has already navigated the competent authority coordination process, rather than one your team is assembling for the first time under deadline pressure, with the governance risk that carries.

The second is business function mapping done to the standard that scenario-based testing needs. The outcome here is a genuine, evidenced understanding of which ICT systems and third parties sit behind a specific critical service, and how a failure would propagate through it, not a list of applications with a criticality label attached. Getting this right is what determines whether everything that follows in the testing programme tests the right thing at all, and it is a different discipline to running the test itself.

A useful first move costs nothing but honesty. Take your current testing calendar and, service by service, ask whether it was built around what the business actually delivers or around the systems your team happens to own. For most firms, that single exercise will surface the gap faster than any external assessment could.

The sequence from there matters. Mapping before testing, testing before remediation evidence, remediation evidence before TLPT governance. Each step makes the next one meaningful, and skipping ahead tends to produce activity without proof. Building that sequence properly, before a supervisor or a real incident forces the pace, is the difference between a testing programme that demonstrates resilience and one that only demonstrates effort.

In this blog article Cyberfort security experts look at what happens when a financial services firms incident management framework is tested for real with an actual incident.  They also look at key actions to take when the regulatory clock starts ticking whether your process is ready or not.

Detecting an incident and reporting it on time are two different capabilities. DORA expects both and many financial services firms have invested far more heavily in one than the other.

DORA’s incident management requirements are not, at heart, a reporting exercise. They are a test of whether your organisation can recognise a genuine problem quickly enough, and describe it accurately enough, for a regulator’s clock to be met without guesswork.

That distinction matters because most financial services firms already have monitoring tools, a security operations function and an incident process of some kind. What DORA exposes is whether that process was ever designed to answer regulatory questions under time pressure; severity, impact, cross-border relevance, rather than just internal ones like ‘is this resolved yet’.

So, the practical question for a senior security leader when it comes to Incident Management and DORA is not ‘do we have incident management’. It is ‘can we classify an incident correctly within the first hour, and can we prove with a documented root-cause record that we did, for every major incident, not just the ones that made the board pack’.

Most regulated financial services firms are not starting from a blank canvas when it comes to incident management. Security information and event management platforms, endpoint detection tooling and around-the-clock monitoring are standard across the sector and have been for some time. Anomalous activity detection – the first of DORA’s obligations, is broadly in place, even if it varies in maturity from one firm to the next.

This is the comfortable part of the picture, and it is often where board-level confidence about DORA incident readiness comes from. If asked ‘can we detect an incident’, most CISOs would say yes, and reasonably so.

The comfort stops there, because detecting something and classifying it in DORA’s terms are not the same skill, and the sector’s investment has overwhelmingly gone into the former.

The regulatory clock is more specific than most incident plans assume

It is worth being precise about what that clock actually requires, because the specificity is the point. Once an incident is classified as major, DORA’s technical standards set out a three-stage reporting path: an initial notification within four hours of classification, and no later than twenty-four hours from when the incident was first detected; an intermediate report within seventy-two hours of that initial notification; and a final report within one month. There is no grace period built into any of those windows for a classification process that is still deliberating.

That is the detail an internal incident plan has to be built around, not the general principle that reporting should happen ‘without undue delay’. A four-hour clock that starts at classification, not at detection, makes the speed and consistency of your classification step the single biggest determinant of whether you report on time at all.

Classification and cross-border relevance are where the process breaks

DORA does not simply ask you to notice an incident. It asks you to classify it by severity, impact, and critically, and if it has cross-border relevance, using a standardised methodology that the European Central Bank and national competent authorities expect to see applied consistently, not improvised on the day.

This is where the Incident Management gap actually sits in many financial services firms when it comes to DORA compliance. Classification decisions are frequently made informally, by whoever is on the incident bridge at the time, using judgement rather than a documented methodology. That might produce a reasonable outcome, but it does not produce a defensible one, and it rarely produces a consistent one across incidents six months apart or across different response teams.

Cross-border relevance is a particular blind spot. Many financial services firms operate across more than one jurisdiction. Yet few have a documented, tested method for deciding when an incident in one entity’s systems has implications that another competent authority needs to know about. That decision, made badly or made late, is exactly the kind of gap DORA was written to close.

The four-hour reporting requirement compounds this. That clock does not wait for your classification process to catch up. It starts at the point of classification, and the twenty-four-hour detection ceiling applies regardless. An informal or slow classification step does not buy you time; it simply means you report late, working from judgement, not a stopwatch.

So what does this mean for financial services organisations?

If your organisation can detect incidents well but has never pressure-tested how quickly and consistently it can classify one against DORA’s specific criteria, you have a gap that will not show up until a real incident forces it into the open.

The practical answer is not more detection tooling. It is a documented, rehearsed classification methodology that turns judgement calls into a repeatable process, backed by a root-cause and remediation record that exists for every major incident as a matter of course, not assembled retrospectively when a regulator asks for it.

So where should financial services firms start with building this capability? At Cyberfort we believe there are four key steps organisations should undertake when it comes to building out the reporting capabilities to become DORA compliant. Each step should be built as a sequence, not a single project. Every step depends on the one before it and skipping ahead tends to produce a document that looks complete but has not actually been tested.

Define, in writing, exactly how severity, impact and cross-border relevance are assessed and by whom. Not as a judgement call for whoever is on the bridge, but as a repeatable method that produces the same classification for the same facts, every time it is applied.

A methodology that has only ever been read, not used, will not survive contact with a real incident. Run it through tabletop exercises that specifically test the ‘is this major’ and ‘is this cross-border’ decisions, not just the technical response.

Do not treat root-cause analysis as a follow-up task completed after the pressure is off. Make it a mandatory close-out step for every major incident, owned by a named individual, so the record exists whether or not a regulator ever asks to see it.

Know, in advance, exactly who reports to which competent authority, in what format, and how anonymised data feeds into the EU-wide information-sharing frameworks. This should be a pre-agreed pathway, not something worked out during the incident itself.

How do you know if your Incident Response process is working?

When working with Financial Services firms we often find the below measures and management approaches to incident management and reporting tell you whether the 4-step process outlined above is actually working, not just documented.

Time from detection to classification. This matters because DORA’s four-hour reporting clock only starts once you classify an incident as major, so a slow classification step erodes the time you have to report well. Aim to bring this down to well under an hour for anything touching a critical or important function, not days, and ideally not much more than the time it takes to convene the right people.

Consistency of classification outcomes. If two similar incidents, assessed months apart, produce different severity or cross-border judgements, your methodology is not standardised. It is a matter of who happened to be on the call. Track this by periodically re-testing past incident facts against the current methodology and checking the outcome matches. Aim for full consistency; any drift is a sign the documented method has stopped being the one actually used.

Root-cause analysis completion rate. This is the clearest proof that remediation is a genuine discipline rather than a box-ticking exercise once the pressure is off. Aim for a completed, reviewed root-cause record for every major incident, with none left open beyond the timeframe your own process sets for closing them out.

Reporting timeliness against the regulatory window. This is the most visible metric to a regulator and the hardest to fix retrospectively. Aim for full adherence to the four-hour, seventy-two-hour and one-month deadlines for every major incident and treat any near-miss on timing as a signal to fix the classification step upstream, not the reporting step itself.

Tabletop exercise frequency and findings closure. A methodology that is never rehearsed is a document, not a capability. Aim to run realistic incident classification exercises at least annually, with every material finding from each exercise closed out before the next one runs, otherwise you are simply re-discovering the same gap on a yearly cycle.

These figures are directional good-practice targets, not numeric thresholds DORA itself prescribes. Your own risk appetite, the criticality of the functions involved and the jurisdictions you operate in should all shape exactly where you set the bar. The point is to set it explicitly and measure against it, rather than to hit a specific number for its own sake.

Where you’ll likely need further support

Two areas tend to need outside input when it comes to DORA expectations around incident management and reporting, even in organisations with strong internal security teams.

The first is cross-border classification logic. Working out when an incident in one jurisdiction needs to be flagged to another competent authority is a legal and regulatory judgement as much as a technical one. Getting outside support here means arriving at a workable internal standard your team can apply consistently in the moment; built on expertise that has seen how different national authorities actually interpret the requirement in practice, rather than relying on a legal opinion sought for the first time in the middle of a live incident.

The second is independent rehearsal. An incident classification exercise designed and run by the same team that will use it in a real incident tends to test what that team already believes, rather than what a regulator or an external reviewer would actually probe. Bringing in an outside facilitator, unattached to the existing process, means the gap in your methodology is found before a real incident does with a specific, evidenced list of what to fix, rather than a rehearsal that quietly confirms the plan already in place.

Final thoughts

Detection was never the hard part of DORA’s incident requirements and treating it as though it is, is the most common reason organisations misjudge their own readiness. The hard part is classification, consistency and the discipline to produce a defensible record every time, not just when it is convenient. Start there, test it before a real incident does, and the reporting deadline stops being the thing you are afraid of.

The threat your controls were never designed to see

There is a fraud technique spreading rapidly across every sector that has nothing to do with malware, phishing links, or compromised credentials. It does not trigger your SIEM. It bypasses your email gateway. It has no payload for your endpoint agent to detect. And in 40%+ of organisations that have experienced it, it has succeeded.

The technique is AI-powered deepfake executive impersonation. Understanding how it works, why it works, and what actually stops it is one of the most important things a security, finance leader or board member can do right now.

How the attack landscape has changed

Executive impersonation is not new. Fraudsters have long posed as C-Level executives in emails, invoking urgency and authority to push through unauthorised payments. What has changed, fundamentally and recently, is the cost and complexity of doing it convincingly.

Until very recently, cloning a voice or generating a synthetic video required significant technical expertise, specialist equipment, and considerable time. It was a capability largely confined to well-resourced criminal groups and nation-state actors. That barrier has gone.

Today, generative AI tools that can clone a voice from a few minutes of audio are freely available online. The same technology that powers legitimate productivity tools including voice synthesis, video generation, and natural language models, is being repurposed by fraudsters who need no technical expertise to use them. The result is a 1,500% increase in deepfake attacks since 2023 (UK Gov 2025 Study), and an average financial impact of a successful attack being estimated to be over £210,000.

The democratisation of this capability is the critical shift. Attacks that previously required sophisticated criminal infrastructure can now be launched by individuals. The volume of attempts is increasing not because more sophisticated actors have emerged, but because the barrier to entry has effectively collapsed.

Why human judgement is the target and why that is hard to defend

To understand why this threat is so difficult to defend against, it helps to understand what it is actually attacking.

Most organisational fraud controls assume that the weakest link is the technology, that if you can secure the perimeter, filter the email, and lock down the endpoint, you have addressed the risk. Deepfake impersonation attacks do not target the technology. They target the trust that people place in the voices and faces of their colleagues and leaders.

Consider the typical high-value payment authorisation process. A finance director receives a call from someone who sounds exactly like the CEO, requesting an urgent transfer ahead of a deal closing. The voice, the tone, the vocabulary, and the sense of urgency are all consistent with the genuine article. The finance director has no reason to doubt what they are hearing, and every reason to act quickly.

The verification mechanism in that scenario is human judgement. And human judgement is precisely what AI-powered impersonation is engineered to defeat.

This is not a failure of intelligence or awareness on the part of the individual. It is a structural vulnerability in how organisations communicate and authorise actions, one that has existed for years but that has only recently become practically exploitable at scale.

The exposure organisations are not measuring

One of the most significant and underappreciated aspects of this threat is how much publicly available material already exists that could be used to construct a convincing impersonation.

For most organisations with any public profile, and for most executives who are active in their industry, the raw material needed to train an impersonation model is already out there. LinkedIn videos, Keynote recordings, Investor calls, Press interviews, Webinars, Podcast appearances. Every piece of public audio and video content featuring a senior leader is, from an attacker’s perspective, training data.

Most organisations have no idea how extensive that exposure is. They have never mapped it, or quantified it, and therefore cannot make informed decisions about how to manage it. The exposure assessment, understanding what is publicly accessible and what risk it creates, is the first and most important step in addressing this threat, because it moves the organisation from assumption to evidence.

Why existing controls have a structural blind spot

It is worth being direct about why conventional security investments do not address this risk, not as a criticism of those investments, but because understanding the gap is necessary to filling it.

Email security controls are designed to analyse digital artefacts: headers, links, attachments, sender reputation. A deepfake attack that arrives as a phone call or a WhatsApp voice note has none of these characteristics. There is nothing to scan.

SIEM and endpoint detection tools look for anomalous system behaviour, indicators of compromise, and known attack signatures. A fraudulent phone call does not generate system events. There is no log entry to correlate.

DLP tools monitor data moving across systems. A payment authorised verbally following a fraudulent instruction does not cross a data loss boundary the tool was designed to detect.

This is not a technology problem that more technology will solve, at least not primarily. The attack surface here is the communication channel and the human trust it carries, and the defence requires interventions that operate at that level.

What effective defence actually looks like

Understanding this threat clearly points toward what effective defence requires. From our experience at Cyberfort there are four interconnected components which need to be in place to defend against a deepfake attack:

Exposure mapping. Before any organisation can make informed decisions about its risk, it needs to understand what material already exists publicly and which individuals carry the greatest impersonation risk. A structured exposure review produces that picture and identifies where reduction is possible.

Risk assessment. Not all scenarios carry equal risk. The combination of who could be impersonated, which communication channels are most vulnerable, and which teams are most likely to act on impersonated instructions creates a specific risk profile that varies by organisation. Understanding that profile lets you prioritise your response.

Scenario-based testing. Awareness training that tells people deepfakes exist is not sufficient preparation. What prepares people is working through realistic simulations: hearing what a cloned voice actually sounds like, experiencing the psychology of an authority-and-urgency scenario, and practising the verification instincts needed to slow down and challenge. Organisations that have been through this consistently report it as the single most impactful element of their preparation.

Procedural controls. The most durable defence is embedding out-of-band verification into high-risk processes, making it structurally normal, rather than exceptional, to pause and confirm through a secondary channel before acting on a significant instruction. This does not slow organisations down in practice; it removes the friction that fraudsters rely on.

When this risk becomes particularly acute

While every organisation with any public profile carries some exposure, certain situations materially increase the risk or the consequences of a successful attack.

Executives who are active on LinkedIn, YouTube, or in industry media carry higher impersonation risk simply by virtue of the volume of publicly available material. Organisations going through mergers, acquisitions, or leadership changes create a period of uncertainty and unfamiliar communication patterns that fraudsters actively exploit, staff may be less sure what normal looks like, and more inclined to defer to authority. Publicly listed companies face particular scrutiny because their leadership and financial processes are more visible.

Organisations with large or frequent payment authorisation processes, particularly where those processes involve a small number of decision-makers acting on verbal instruction, carry concentrated exposure. Recent near-misses or suspected fraud attempts are a signal that the organisation may already be on a target list. And insurance renewals and regulatory audits increasingly ask direct questions about this threat, which means the question of whether you have addressed it is coming regardless.

 Five key questions organisations should be asking when it comes to deepfake and execution impersonation attacks

For any security or risk leader thinking through their organisation’s position on this threat, five questions are worth asking:

1. How much publicly available audio and video material exists featuring your senior leaders, and have you ever assessed it as an attack surface?

2. Do your finance, HR, and executive assistant teams have specific, practised protocols for verifying the identity of a caller or video sender before acting on a sensitive instruction?

3. Have your high-risk teams ever experienced a realistic impersonation simulation,  not been told it exists, but actually worked through one

4. Could you articulate to your board, in concrete terms, what your current exposure to this risk is and what controls are in place to manage it?

5. If a successful attack occurred tomorrow, would your incident response procedures cover this scenario?

If the honest answer to any of these is no, or not sure, that is the gap which needs to be addressed through training, policy updates and staff awareness of Deepfake and Executive impersonation attacks.

How quickly do you need to act and what’s involved

One of the useful things about this threat is that addressing it does not require a lengthy programme. The core work – exposure mapping, risk assessment, scenario testing, procedural control design can be completed in a focused engagement that does not consume significant internal resource or disrupt day-to-day operations. The output is a clear picture of exposure, a tested and trained team, and a set of practical controls embedded in process.

So, What does this look like?

As mentioned earlier in the article addressing this threat requires more than awareness. It requires a structured assessment of your actual exposure, a tested understanding of how your people respond under realistic conditions, and practical controls that embed durable resilience.

For example, at Cyberfort we have built a Deepfake & Executive Impersonation Defence service to help organisations prepare themselves against this type of attack effectively.

It begins with an Executive Exposure Review – a systematic mapping of the publicly available material that could be used to impersonate your key individuals. Most organisations are genuinely surprised by what this surfaces. Understanding your exposure is the essential first step.

Step 2 involves a structured Deepfake Risk Assessment that identifies your highest-risk scenarios, communication channels, and roles. Not every part of your organisation carries the same level of risk. Knowing where to focus is what makes the response proportionate and effective.

Step 3 puts your people through realistic Fraud Scenario Testing – AI-powered impersonation simulations that replicate the conditions of a real attack. This is where organisations learn the difference between theoretical awareness and genuine resilience. It is also where the specific gaps in your human controls become visible, in a controlled environment, before an attacker finds them for you.

Step 4 combines targeted AI Awareness Training with the delivery of an Executive Protection Playbook: practical verification protocols, out-of-band confirmation procedures, escalation paths, and governance processes that your teams can use immediately and sustain over time.

The outcome is not just a report. It is an organisation that has moved from unknown exposure to active, measurable resilience, with the board-level evidence of due diligence that regulators, insurers, and investors increasingly expect.

From our experience at Cyberfort, the organisations that are best placed to mitigate the risks against this type of attack are not necessarily the most technologically sophisticated. They are the ones that have looked at this honestly, understood where their exposure lies, and put the right human controls in place. That is an achievable position for any organisation, and it is a significantly better one than discovering the gap through a successful attack.

The attack that starts next door

When security teams map their risks, they tend to focus on what they can see and control: their own infrastructure, endpoints, and perimeter. That instinct is understandable. It is also increasingly misaligned with how the most significant breaches of the last two years have happened.

The pattern is consistent. An organisation with mature security controls, a hardened perimeter, and a well-resourced IT team is compromised, not through their own systems, but through a supplier. A managed service provider with access to their network, a software vendor whose update mechanism became a delivery vehicle for malicious code, a cloud platform partner whose credentials were harvested and used to move laterally into the customer’s environment.

The attacker did not knock on the front door. They walked in through a side entrance that the target organisation had never fully audited, and in many cases, did not even know existed.

This is the defining characteristic of modern supply chain cyber risk. It does not respect the perimeter you have built. It exploits the trust relationships you have extended, often necessarily, often legitimately, to the network of third parties your organisation depends on to function.

The scale of the problem is structural, not incidental

It would be reassuring to treat high-profile supply chain attacks as edge cases: sophisticated operations carried out by well-resourced nation-state actors against strategically significant targets. The data does not support that reassurance.

According to the Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report 2025, more than 30% of data breaches now involve a third-party element. Blackberry’s 2024 survey of IT decision-makers found that more than 75% of software supply chains had been exposed to a cyber attack in the preceding twelve months. And the UK Government’s Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025 found that only 14% of organisations had undertaken a formal security review of their supply chain in the last year.

Read those three figures together and the picture becomes clear. Third-party attacks are not rare. They are not declining. And the vast majority of organisations have not formally assessed the risk they carry through their supplier relationships.

This is not primarily a technology problem. It is a governance and visibility problem. Most organisations have grown their supplier base organically over years or decades, extending access and data-sharing relationships as the business required them, without building a proportionate framework for assessing and managing the security posture of those suppliers over time.

The result is a risk landscape that is both significant and largely invisible.

Why traditional approaches fall short

The conventional response to supply chain risk tends to rely on one of two mechanisms: contractual protections, or certification-based assurance. Both have genuine value. Neither is sufficient on its own.

A supplier’s ISO 27001 certificate, or their signed GDPR data processing agreement, tells you about their intent and their documented processes at the point the certificate was issued. It does not tell you about the controls that are actually operating today, in the specific parts of their business that touch your data and your systems. Certification can be narrowly scoped, out of date, or simply not reflective of the real-world security posture of an organisation at a given moment.

Supplier questionnaires suffer from a different but related problem. They are typically completed once, reviewed once, filed, and then largely forgotten, while the risk environment continues to evolve. A supplier that passed your assessment two years ago may have undergone significant organisational change, technology change, or personnel change since then. The questionnaire response that gave you comfort at the time has not been updated to reflect any of it.

The deeper issue is one of volume and capacity. A typical mid-sized organisation has dozens, sometimes hundreds of suppliers with some form of digital access or data-sharing relationship. Applying consistent, meaningful scrutiny to every one of those relationships, at the depth required to form a genuine view of security posture, is not feasible without a structured, risk-prioritised approach that distinguishes between the suppliers that represent real exposure and those that do not.

The five gaps that create real exposure

Through our work with organisations across financial services, professional services, engineering, and critical infrastructure, five specific gaps appear with consistent regularity.

The first is the absence of a consolidated supplier inventory. Most organisations cannot produce, without significant effort, a complete list of which third parties have access to their systems, what level of access they hold, and what data they can reach. That baseline simply does not exist in a structured, maintained form.

The second is the reliance on static risk pictures in a dynamic environment. Supplier relationships change. Personnel change. Technology changes. A risk assessment that does not have a defined refresh cycle is a record of how things were, not how they are.

The third is the gap between contractual assurance and operational reality. Contracts establish obligations. They do not verify compliance. The difference between what a supplier is contractually required to do and what their security controls actually look like in practice can be significant, and that gap is rarely visible without independent assessment.

The fourth is the absence of incident response planning that accounts for supplier failure. Most organisations have internal incident response plans. Far fewer have pre-agreed response playbooks that cover the specific scenario where a supplier is compromised and the organisation needs to contain, investigate, and communicate about that compromise quickly. When a supplier incident occurs, the organisations that respond well are those that had already mapped their exposure in advance.

The fifth is the growing commercial and regulatory pressure that makes this governance gap increasingly visible. Insurers are asking harder questions about third-party risk management as a condition of coverage. Regulated sectors face specific obligations around supply chain oversight. Enterprise customers are requesting evidence of third-party assurance as part of procurement processes. The organisations that cannot answer these questions clearly are finding that the absence of a supply chain risk framework carries direct commercial consequences.

The right approach: structured, risk-prioritised, proportionate

Effective supply chain risk management does not mean applying the same level of scrutiny to every supplier relationship. It means having a clear, defensible basis for understanding which supplier relationships represent the greatest exposure and directing your assurance effort accordingly.

That starts with building and maintaining a structured view of your supplier landscape: who has access, at what level, to what data and systems. It continues with a risk-prioritised approach to assessment that distinguishes between critical suppliers, significant suppliers, and low-risk relationships, and applies proportionate scrutiny to each tier. It is sustained through embedding supply chain security assessment into procurement and vendor management processes so that new relationships are evaluated consistently before access is granted, not retrospectively.

The output of this kind of programme is not just reduced risk. It is the documented evidence of due diligence that regulators, insurers, and enterprise customers are increasingly requiring and that boards need to be able to point to when the question of third-party risk management is raised.

When does this typically become urgent?

Supply chain cyber risk tends to crystallise as a priority at specific moments. Organisations approaching an insurance renewal are often asked to demonstrate their third-party risk management practices for the first time. Those going through merger or acquisition activity find that supply chain security is a growing focus of technical due diligence. Those onboarding a new critical supplier, a managed service provider, a cloud infrastructure partner, a key software vendor, recognise that they are extending significant trust and need to verify that it is warranted.

Public sector organisations facing procurement requirements, professional services firms whose clients are asking for evidence of supply chain assurance, and businesses that have recently experienced an incident (however contained) that involved a third-party element also consistently find that this becomes a priority quickly.

In each case, the trigger is different. The underlying question is the same: do we have genuine visibility of the risk we carry through our supplier relationships, and can we demonstrate that we are managing it?

The most critical lessons learned are through the toughest trials. The cybersecurity industry is no stranger to this concept. Global headlines often confirm that the defenders’ dilemma, which demands perfect accuracy, isn’t a foolproof principle. Historically, when threat actors have succeeded with devastating breaches, the fallout has contributed to pivotal moments in history. The valuable lessons learned from these moments often pave the way for future technological innovation that changes how we look at security. What follows are five pivotal moments, and the lessons they taught us.

In a connected world, where every minute offline is costly, resilience isn’t built in the middle of an attack; it’s built long before one ever begins. See how Halcyon stays one step ahead of ever-changing threats, and request a demo by emailing [email protected] to discover the future of smarter protection.

With a ransomware attack occurring every 19 seconds today and projections showing attacks occurring every 2 seconds by 2031, security teams need a new approach to combat this existential threat effectively.

Enlisting top data scientists, threat researchers, and practitioners from the cybersecurity world, we developed the Halcyon Anti-Ransomware Platform that protects across all stages of an attack.

Organisations incorporating Halcyon into their security framework achieve resilience to ransomware that they never thought possible, reducing the risk of ransomware impacting their operations significantly.

The threat a successful ransomware attack impacts your organization has never been higher. By incorporating the Halcyon Anti-Ransomware Platform into your security framework, you get the targeted ransomware security you need to ensure your organisation can withstand any ransomware attack it encounters today, tomorrow, and in the future.

To see Halcyon in action, contact us at [email protected] and one of our experts can demonstrate the solution for your organisation.

Cyber threats don’t stand still. Neither do the standards designed to stop them. If your organisation holds Cyber Essentials a Cyber Essentials Plus (CE+) certification, or has been thinking about this certification, there’s something important you need to know: the standard has been updated, and the bar has been raised.

This isn’t a minor tweak. The refreshed Cyber Essentials Plus framework reflects the reality of how businesses operate today, cloud-first environments, remote workforces, mobile devices, and an attack surface that looks nothing like it did when the original standard was written.

The good news? If you act now, you can get ahead of it. Here’s everything you need to know.

Why Cyber Essentials Plus Matters More Than Ever

Let’s start with the basics. Cyber Essentials is the UK government-backed certification scheme designed to help organisations protect themselves against the most common cyber-attacks – phishing, malware, ransomware, and unauthorised access. Cyber Essentials Plus takes that a step further: rather than a self-assessed questionnaire, it involves independent technical verification. An assessor actually tests your systems to confirm your controls work in practice, not just on paper.

For your customers, that distinction matters enormously.

In a landscape where supply chain attacks are increasingly common, your clients, partners, and procurement teams aren’t just asking whether you have a security policy, they’re asking whether you can prove it. CE+ is that proof. It tells the world that your defences have been independently tested and verified, not self-declared. For organisations bidding on government contracts, working in regulated sectors, or handling sensitive customer data, CE+ isn’t a nice-to-have. It’s increasingly a commercial prerequisite.

Beyond the contractual angle, there’s the practical one. Cyber Essentials Plus certification gives your leadership team confidence that the five core technical controls – firewalls, secure configuration, user access control, malware protection, and patch management are genuinely in place and functioning. That confidence has real value when a board is assessing risk, when an insurer is pricing a cyber policy, or when a customer is deciding whether to trust you with their data.

The updated standard makes that assurance even more meaningful, because it’s been designed for the way businesses actually work in 2026 and beyond.

What’s Changed: Old Standard vs New

The original Cyber Essentials framework was built for a world of on-premise infrastructure, desktop computers, and relatively contained network perimeters. That world has largely gone. The updated standard acknowledges this and closes the gaps that the old version left open.

Cloud services are now firmly in scope – Under the previous standard, cloud-hosted services occupied a grey area. Many organisations assumed that if a service was managed by a third-party provider, it fell outside the scope of their assessment. The updated framework makes clear that cloud services including Software as a Service (SaaS) platforms are in scope where your organisation controls the configuration. If your staff are using Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, or any other cloud platform, the way those environments are configured now counts. That’s a significant shift for organisations that have migrated heavily to the cloud and assumed their provider was handling security on their behalf.

Home and hybrid working environments are addressed directly – The old standard was written before remote working became the norm for millions of UK employees. The updated version explicitly addresses devices used outside the corporate network – including home broadband routers and personal devices used for work. If your staff are connecting from home, those endpoints and the networks they sit on are now part of the picture. For many organisations, this will require a fresh look at device management, VPN policies, and the controls applied to personally-owned devices used for work purposes.

Thin clients and virtual desktops are included – As more organisations move to virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) and thin-client environments, the updated standard provides clearer guidance on how these are assessed. The previous version left room for ambiguity; the new one closes it.

Firmware and router security – The updated standard tightens requirements around routers and firewalls, including the firmware running on them. Default credentials, unpatched firmware, and misconfigured boundary devices have been a consistent entry point for attackers, the revised standard makes it harder to overlook these.

Stronger password and authentication requirements – The bar on credential security has been raised. The updated standard aligns more closely with current NCSC guidance on password policies, multi-factor authentication, and account management. If your organisation is still relying on password complexity rules alone, without MFA on internet-facing services, you’ll need to address that before you can certify.

Malware protection scope expanded – The updated framework takes a broader view of malware protection, including application allow-listing as an accepted control and providing clearer guidance on what’s required for different device types. Organisations that have relied on traditional antivirus alone may find they need to review their approach.

Taken together, these changes mean that organisations which previously held CE+ certification cannot assume they’ll pass under the new standard without a fresh assessment of their controls. The scope is wider, the requirements are more precise, and the technical verification is more thorough.

Why you need to ‘Act Now’ and how Cyberfort can help

At Cyberfort, we’ve been working with the Cyber Essentials framework since its inception. We’re an IASME-accredited Certification Body, which means we can take you through the full CE+ process,  from readiness assessment through to certification, with a team that understands both the technical requirements and the commercial pressures you’re working under.

Our approach to CE+ is built around three things: preparation, verification, and remediation.

Preparation – Before we put your organisation through the formal assessment, we work with you to understand your current environment, your devices, your cloud services, your remote working setup, your boundary controls. We identify the gaps against the new standard and give you a clear, prioritised action plan. No surprises on assessment day.

Verification – Our technical assessors carry out the hands-on testing that CE+ requires including scanning your external-facing systems, testing your internal controls, and verifying that what you’ve documented is what’s actually in place. This is where CE+ earns its credibility, and it’s where our experience makes a real difference. We’ve assessed organisations who have different IT estate sizes and complexity, and we know what the assessors look for.

Remediation support – If gaps are found and in our experience, they usually are, particularly under the updated standard, we don’t just flag them and walk away. Our technical team can help you close them, whether that’s configuring MFA across your cloud platforms, tightening your patch management process, or reviewing your device management policies. We see the assessment and the remediation as part of the same engagement, not two separate conversations.

The reason to act now is straightforward: the updated standard is in effect, and the window to prepare is shorter than most organisations realise. If your current certification is due for renewal, you’ll be assessed against the new requirements. If you’re pursuing CE+ for the first time, you’re starting under the new standard from day one. Either way, the organisations that begin their preparation earliest are the ones that certify fastest and the ones that avoid the costly scramble of last-minute remediation.

Why Cyberfort for CE+?

There’s no shortage of organisations offering Cyber Essentials assessments. So why does it matter who you choose?

Because certification is only part of the story. What matters is what happens before the assessment and what you’re left with afterwards.

Cyberfort brings together accredited certification, deep technical expertise, and a genuine understanding of the threat landscape. Our assessors aren’t ticking boxes; they’re experienced security professionals who understand how attackers think and where defences typically fail. That means our pre-assessment work is sharper, our gap analysis is more accurate, and our remediation guidance is practical rather than theoretical.

We also bring continuity. Many of our customers come to us for CE+ and stay with us for broader security services including penetration testing, managed detection and response, and security awareness training. That’s not a sales pitch; it’s a reflection of how security works in practice. Cyber Essentials Plus is a foundation, not a finish line, and having a partner who can support you beyond certification means you’re building on solid ground rather than starting from scratch every year.

Glen Williams, CEO of Cyberfort, recently joined Guy Clapperton on The Near Futurist Podcast to discuss how cyber security has moved far beyond basic antivirus and controls. In this two-part interview series, they explore how the threat landscape is evolving, what hasn’t changed and where businesses need to invest to be protected in the future against a changing cyber-attack landscape.

In part 2 Glen and Guy cover:

  • Why certifications are not enough to keep your business secure 
  • Communicating key cyber security messages across an organisation
  • The importance of a cyber resilience mindset and culture
  • Evaluating a cyber security services provider for your business
  • The UK Cyber Resilience Act and how it will impact businesses

How to Use Continuous Compliance to Scale Your Program

Introduction:  

How can we reimagine GRC?

Your governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) program requires more time and resources to manage than ever before. With increasing security expectations from customers, growing requirements to scale compliance across additional frameworks, and the need to track a growing list of vendors, the burden of your GRC program is ever-increasing.

As GRC workloads grow, many security and compliance professionals have fewer hours to focus on strategic work that strengthens the security posture of their organisation. 

Your GRC program needs tools that enable continuous compliance to take work off your plate and help you manage and monitor changes across your controls and vendors so you can focus on innovation. 

This buyer’s guide will help you understand continuous compliance and what to look for in a continuous compliance solution to scale your GRC program.

As a specialist cyber security consultancy, Cyberfort can implement, configure, and manage Vanta on your behalf, so your team gets the certification outcome without the overhead.

For more information about Cyberfort and Vanta services contact us at [email protected]  and one of our experts will be in touch to show how the Vanta platform significantly saves time, cost and effort associated with cyber security compliance.

Glen Williams, CEO of Cyberfort, recently joined Guy Clapperton on The Near Futurist Podcast to discuss how cyber security has moved far beyond basic antivirus and controls. In this two-part interview series, they explore how the threat landscape is evolving, what hasn’t changed and where businesses need to invest to be protected in the future against a changing cyber-attack landscape.

In part 1 they explore:

  • Why cyber security needs to be taken as seriously as physical security 
  • The ‘tooling and compliance’ misconception trap many businesses have fallen into
  • The importance of creating a cyber security culture in a business and not just relying on the IT team
  • Why deepfake attacks are on the rise and what steps organisations can take to mitigate this type of attack
  • Why certifications are important, but regular security testing holds the key to becoming resilient against attack

Cyberfort
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